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TITLE I-SPECIAL GRAND JURY
I. INTRODUCTION
Title I establishes special grand juries to sit in major population
areas and other areas designated by the Attorney General. 1 These
grand juries are protected from arbitrary dismissal by the district
court before completion of their work.2 They can sit for extended
periods (a maximum of thirty-six months), 3 and are authorized to
issue reports concerning (a) noncriminal misconduct of appointed
government officials or employees involving organized criminal
activity; and (b) organized crime conditions within the district.
4
When reports are issued concerning governmental misconduct,
individuals named are given notice, afforded the opportunity to
present evidence, file an answer, and obtain judicial review, all
prior to publication. 5 This title also amends the Jencks Act (18
U.S.C. § 3500) by including grand jury minutes in its definition of
"statements," and expanding its coverage to statements of pros-
pective witnesses in the government's possession regardless of
their source.6
II. SPECIAL GRAND JURY PROVISIONS
A. Impaneling of Special Grand Juries
In addition to regular grand juries serving in a judicial district,
title I requires the district court to impanel a special grand jury at
least once every eighteen months if the district has a population
greater than four million, or if the Attorney General certifies that
in his judgment there is criminal activity requiring such a grand
jury. 7 The "four million" designation was designed to include
within its confines most geographic areas of major organized
criminal activity. 8 The above impaneling prerequisites apply "un-
1 18 U.S.C.A. § 3331(a)(Supp. 1971).
2 1d. § 333 1(b).
3 1d. § 333 1(a).
4 Id. § 3333(a)(2).
5 Id. § 3333(c).
6 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 [hereinafter cited as O.C.C.A.] § 102, 18
U.S.C.A. § 3500 (Supp. 1971), amending 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964). See Hearings on S. 30
and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
9 1st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 27, at 305 (1970) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
7 18 U.S.C.A. § 3331(a) (Supp. 1971).
8 As of the 1960 census, the following districts would be encompassed by this provision:
Massachusetts, Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, New Jersey, Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, Western District of Pennsylvania, Southern District of Florida,
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less another special grand jury is then serving." 9 This quali-
fication, read in conjunction with the prior requirements, appar-
ently does not limit the number of special grand juries a district
court could call, but does appear to limit the Attorney General's
power to compel the district court to summon a special grand jury
to a maximum of one per eighteen month period per district.
Thus, if crime in one district required the impaneling of more than
one special grand jury, or the special grand jury in existence was
overburdened with work, the Attorney General would be pow-
erless to require the summoning of an additional special grand
jury. Discretion would remain in the district court.
Consistent with the established federal law concerning grand
juries,1 0 the ordinary term of the special grand jury is eighteen
months; however the special grand jury can be discharged earlier
by an order of the court if the special grand jury determines by
majority vote that its work is completed.1 1 If at the end of the
special grand jury's term or any extension thereof, the district
court determines that the work of the grand jury has not yet been
completed, the court can extend the term for additional periods of
six months, up to a maximum of thirty-six months.1 2 The district
court may also summon an additional special grand jury when the
court determines that the special grand jury's volume of business
exceeds its capacity to discharge its obligations.1 3
The special grand jury is protected from arbitrary dismissal by
the district court through the grant of appellate recourse. If a
district court fails to extend the term of a special grand jury upon
the grand jury's application for an extension, or dismisses the
grand jury before it completes its work, the special grand jury may
apply to the chief judge of the circuit for the continuance of its
term. 14 The term will then continue pending appeal. 15 This appeal
provision, however, does not apply to the situation in which a
judge rejects a special grand jury's request to impanel an addition-
al special grand jury because its workload is too burdensome.' 6 In
Eastern District of Michigan, Northern and Southern Districts of Ohio, Northern District
of Illinois, and Northern and Southern Districts of California. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT, 340-42 (1961).
9 18 U.S.C.A. § 333 1(a) (Supp. 1971).
1
0 
See note 19 infra.
11 18 U.S.C.A. § 3331(a) (Supp. 1971). The rationale for allowing the grand jury to make
this determination is that it is better able to judge when its work is completed. S. REP. No.
91- 617, 91 st Cong., I st Sess. 141 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
12 18 U.S.C.A. § 333 1(a) (Supp. 1971). However, under certain circumstances this
maximum may be exceeded. See note 104 infra and accompanying text.
13 18 U.S.C.A. § 3332(b) (Supp. 1971).
14 Id. § 333 1(b).
15 Id.
16 Id. §§ 333 I(b), 3332(b).
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contrast, the federal law existing at the time of this Act's passage,
and still applicable to regular grand juries,' 7 enables a judge to
discharge a grand jury "at any time, for any reason or for no
reason," regardless of whether the grand jury had completed its
work. 18 Moreover, these bodies are limited to a term of eighteen
months with no provisions for extensions. 19
B. Scope of Investigation
The scope of the special grand jury's investigatory authority
extends to inquiring "into offenses against the criminal laws of the
United States alleged to have been committed within that dis-
trict."2 0 Thus, the scope is the same as that provided for regular
grand juries.2' The alleged offenses may be brought to the atten-
tion of the grand jury by the court or by the prosecutor.22 The
prosecutor must present to the grand jury information of such
alleged offenses which he has obtained from any other person, if
requested by such person to do so. 23 In addition, the prosecutor
must inform the grand jury of the identity of the complainant and
the action he has taken or recommends be taken with regard to
the alleged offense.2 4 This requirement is a departure from the law
applicable to regular grand juries where the prosecutor is given a
measure of discretion with regard to the information he presents
to the grand jury.
2 5
17 See text accompanying notes 35- 38 infra.
"8 In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 107 F. Supp. 628, 629 (D.D.C. 1952);
United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 292 (N.D. Cal. 1952) (proceedings on motions
to dismiss indictment-extensive discussion of the powers and duties of the grand jury).
19 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(g). This rule states in part: "no grand jury may serve more than 18
months."
20 18 U.S.C.A. § 3332(a) (Supp. 1971).
2 1 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59-60 (1906) (grand jury may investigate without
specific charge pending against an individual; the grand jurors may "inquire for themselves
whether a crime cognizable by the court has been committed .... " Id. at 65). See also
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1919). It should be noted that the special
grand jury is not limited to investigating organized criminal activity. See 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3332(a) (Supp. 1971); House Hearings 119-20.
22 18 U.S.C.A. § 3332(a) (Supp. 1971).
A question could be raised over whether, by the insertion of this clause, Congress
intended to restrict the traditional power of the grand jury to act on information derived
from their own personal knowledge (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 65). The clause does
not appear to have this restrictive effect. By enacting § 3334, Congress has made all prior
law applicable to regular grand juries apply to special grand juries to the extent not
inconsistent with the other sections of this title. In addition by placing permissive language
in § 3332(a) ("[s]uch alleged offenses may be brought to the attention .... ) instead of
words of compulsion, it appears Congress has allowed these grand juries to retain this
traditional power. This interpretation is especially compelling when considered with the
manifest purpose of this title to strengthen evidence-gathering processes and the grand jury
system. See Statement of Findings and Purpose, O.C.C.A., and SENATE REPORT 48.
2 18 U.S.C.A. § 3332(a) (Supp. 1971).
24 Id.
2 The prosecutor is vested with certain discretion as to what cases he will present to the
grand jury, the number and character of witnesses, and other details of the proceedings.
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III. THE SPECIAL GRAND JURY
It is the avowed purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act
"to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United
States . "..."26 In order to implement this goal, Congress chose to
strengthen "the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process."
27
Since the grand jury is recognized as a particularly effective
instrument in ferreting out organized crime, 28 Congress viewed
the strengthening of this body as essential to the fulfillment of the
Act's objective. 29 The actual language of the statute is unclear,
however, in certain respects, and could lead to difficulties in
application.
A. A Definition of Special Grand Jury
While Congress intended to establish a more powerful "in-
vestigative" grand jury30 it chose to denominate its creation a
"special" grand jury.31 Yet, not only is this term left undefined by
the statute, but the common law definition of special grand jury is
clearly inapplicable.3 2 Conceivably, "special grand jury" might
merely mean any grand jury that performs an investigation. Con-
gress might have intended that any grand jury impaneled to per-
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65 (1906); Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343,
397,443 (1959).
26 Statement of Findings and Purpose, O.C.C.A.
2 7 Id.
28 SENATE REPORT 48. The grand jury is also recognized as being well suited for the
investigation of governmental corruption. See Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul
Blow or Fair Play? 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1117-20 (1955); Note, Special In-
vestigating Grand Jury, I l U. PA. L. REV. 954 (1963). See generally Blakey, Aspects of
the Evidence Gathering Process in Organized Crime Cases: A Preliminary Analysis,
reprinted in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 80, 83-91 (1967).
29 SENATE REPORT 48. Title I was designed to incorporate the recommendations of the
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 200 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION].
30 An investigative grand jury is simply a grand jury which at the time is engaged in an
investigation. See Special Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 28, at 957.
3' 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3331-3333 (Supp. 1971).
32 At common law the terms "regular" and "special" grand juries refer to the method of
organization of the grand jury. A "regular" grand jury is one organized according to a
statute, while a "special" grand jury is organized through an exercise of judicial discretion
that is not specifically authorized by statute. See Special Investigating Grand Jury, supra
note 28, at 957. However, this distinction is inapplicable in the federal system. A federal
court cannot impanel a grand jury by virtue of the inherent power of a judicial tribunal; the
authority must be expressed by statute. Ex parte Mills, 135 U.S. 263, 267 (1890); United
States v. Johnson, 123 F.2d I 11, 118 (7th Cir. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S.
503 (1943) (determination of whether court could reimpanel a grand jury to complete an
investigation). See Orfield, supra note 25, at 367. Cf. United States v. Brown, 36 F.R.D.
204 (D.D.C. 1964), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967) (passage of Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure eliminated any technical meaning to word "special" in special grand
jury- no distinction between regular, additional or special grand juries).
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form an investigation be called a "special grand jury," and have
increased powers under this statute. This was apparently the
intent of title I of S. 30 as it was first proposed in the Senate.33 As
originally proposed, S. 30 would have amended the existing body
of law on the grand jury.34 Under this existing law the grand jury
had the power to investigate,3 5 as well as return indictments; but
they could not sit for extended terms 6 or appeal judicial orders
for their dismissal.3 7 In addition, the court had the power to
summon grand juries to perform investigations whenever it felt
this was required by the public interest.38 Because of the al-
ready-existing investigatory authority, the original bill merely at-
tempted to strengthen the powers of these grand juries in order to
make them more suitable for organized crime investigations.
As title I was finally enacted, however, it did not amend the
existing body of federal law dealing with the grand jury. Instead,
an entirely new chapter was added to the United States Code and
entitled "Special Grand Jury." 39 By rejecting its original plan to
amend the "Grand Jury" chapter (chapter 215), leaving this chap-
ter intact, and promulgating instead an entirely new chapter, it is
unlikely that Congress intended to withdraw all investigative pow-
ers from the "grand jury" and transfer them, substantially
strengthened, to the "special grand jury." The effect of this
change results in the existence of two types of grand
juries-"regular" and "special" -both of which possess in-
vestigative powers. By failing to define affirmatively a "special
grand jury" Congress has provided no standards by which to
determine when a grand jury is a "grand jury" under chapter
21540 [hereinafter referred to as a "regular" grand jury], or a
"special grand jury" under chapter 216.
In view of the stated purpose of the statute, it does seem clear
33 See S. 30, title 1, as originally proposed, reprinted in Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S.
975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1861, S. 2022, S. 2122, and S. 2292 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., I st Sess. 5- 13 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
3 4 The body of law that was to be amended was 18 U.S.C. ch. 215 (1964), entitled
"Grand Jury."
35 For description of grand jury's investigative powers, see Blair v. United States, 250
U.S. 273 (1919); SENATE REPORT 47-51; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
36 See note 19 supra.
3 7 See note 18 supra.
38 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a) reads in part: "The court shall order one or more grand juries to
be summoned at such times as the public interest requires." This section has been
interpreted to give the court full discretion in the convening of grand juries, and such
discretion is not reviewable on appeal. Petition of A & H Transportation, Inc., 319 F.2d
69, 71 (4th Cir. 1963). See generally I C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
Criminal § 101, at 151 (1969). See also House Hearings 553, 438.
39 18 U.S.C.A. ch. 216 (Supp. 1971).
40 18 U.S.C.A. ch. 215 (1964).
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that a grand jury impaneled specifically to investigate organized
criminal activity is a "special grand jury" under chapter 216.41 At
the same time, however, the "special" grand jury is not limited to
investigations into organized crime.42 Nor is a "regular" grand
jury prevented from indicting individuals for offenses involving
organized crime or investigating to obtain such information. 43
The determination of whether a grand jury is "special" with
extended powers, or "regular" without such increased powers
may pose some problems. For example, a possible interpretation
would have a regular grand jury, in the process of investigating
organized criminal activity, automatically becoming a special
grand jury with the passage of this Act. Furthermore, a grand jury
impaneled to investigate municipal corruption could be classified
as a special grand jury as a matter of course. On the other hand it
might be viewed as such only when connections with organized
crime are discovered. As a further illustration of this ambiguity, it
is useful to examine the typical grand jury impaneled to return
indictments (and not authorized to issue reports) in a metropolitan
area. If it is presented with information concerning misconduct of
an appointed official in connection with organized crime, but the
information is not sufficient to result in an indictment, the grand
jury might then be redesignated a special grand jury and a report
may be issued concerning the officials' involvement with organ-
ized crime.44 The report power clearly was not intended to be so
pervasive. 4
5
Furthermore, the Act does not specify who is to make the
determination of whether a grand jury is "special." One in-
terpretation would give this responsibility to the district judge
who impanels it. Title I, since it attempts to compel courts period-
ically to convene grand jury investigations into organized criminal
activity, 46 seeks to limit the court's complete discretion in the
summoning of grand juries that it previously possessed. 47 This
limitation is weakened where the district judge is allowed to
41 See SENATE REPORT 48.
42 18 U.S.C.A. § 3332(a) (Supp. 1971) imposes a duty on the special grand jury to
inquire into "offenses against the criminal laws of United States," and does not restrict the
inquiry to matters concerning organized crime. See House Hearings 120 (remarks of
Senator McClellan).
43 House Hearings 120 (remarks of Senator McClellan).
44 The power to issue reports on the misconduct of appointed public officers or employ-
ees is granted to the special grand jury. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(a)(1) (Supp. 1971).
4See note 99 infra and accompanying text.
46 18 U.S.C.A. § 3331(a) (Supp. 1971). See also House Hearings 97.
47 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a). Title I was originally designed to increase the independence of
the grand jury, and provide some degree of control over the prosecutor and district court




decide whether a grand jury is "regular" or "special." ' 48 A judge,
within the language of title I, could satisfy the technical require-
ments, but evade the purpose of the Act, if he designated as a
special grand jury one impaneled to investigate ordinary criminal
violations having no connections with organized crime. In so
doing, the judge could indirectly give his blessing to organized
criminal activity. Another possibility is that a court could design-
ate as a special grand jury, any grand jury that happened to be in
session at the time, and still meet the requirements of section
3331.49 With this section's vague wording, the possibilities are
numerous.
Moreover, the Attorney General's power to compel the sum-
moning of a special grand jury is limited to situations where
another special grand jury is not then serving. 50 A chief judge of a
district court who resented this executive interference with the
judiciary 51 could frustrate the request by declaring that the grand
jury currently sitting was a "special grand jury." 52 Once again,
this result may occur simply because the statute fails to provide a
test for differentiating between a "special grand jury" and "such
other grand juries as shall be called from time to time."53 It is
unfortunate that the legislature has neglected to specify what it
meant by the term chosen to denominate an entirely new chapter
in title 18 of the United States Code.
B. Appellate Recourse of the Special Grand Jury
When title I was initially drafted, it was designed to create
special grand juries with increased independence from the court
and prosecutor.54 To enable it to exercise the traditional broad
investigative powers deemed necessary for organized crime in-
vestigations, restrictions were proposed that would prevent the
48 18 U.S.C.A. § 3331(a) (Supp. 1971). See letter from Circuit Judge Irving R. Kaufman,
Chairman, Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, to Emanuel Celler, May 12,
1970, reprinted in House Hearings 122.
49 That is, the summoning requirements of calling a special grand jury at least once in
each period of eighteen months.
50 18 U.S.C.A. § 333 1(a) (Supp. 1971).
51 See generally A. VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND
ITS PRESENT DAY SIGNIFICANCE (1953).
52 See factual setting of United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 935 (1965) (U.S. Attorney refused to sign indictment requested by grand jury-court
subsequently ordered the signing and, upon a continued refusal by the U.S. Attorney, cited
him for contempt of court). Cf. Statement of Henry S. Ruth, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Pennsylvania Law School, Senate Hearings 332, 333, suggesting the possi-
bility of a stalemate between the court and prosecutor resulting from the failure of S. 30 to
answer other questions regarding the relationship between these branches.
53 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a).
54 See House Hearings 97, 118- 19.
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prosecutor and district court from exercising arbitrary and abso-
lute control over the special grand jury.
55
These changes transferred a large measure of the instruments
of control over the grand jury from the court to the grand jury
itself.56 Subsequently, the bill was criticized as granting so much
independence5 7 that it presented the potential threat of a "runa-
way" grand jury. 58 The bill finally emerged with the special grand
jury still under the supervision of the district court, but providing
for the special grand jury appellate recourse when the special
grand jury disagreed with certain actions of the district court.
Thus, the special grand jury now can appeal a dismissal order
of the district court, entered before it-the grand jury-
determines that its work is complete. 59 Also, it can appeal a
court's failure to extend its term. 60 Unfortunately, Congress has
failed to give the special grand jury any effective voice when its
workload exceeds its capacity; it has no power to appeal the
denial of a request for an additional grand jury to help it
effectively meet its burdens. Section 3332(b) leaves complete
discretion with the district court to provide an additional grand
jury in this situation.
The omission of an appeal provision here is illogical when
contrasted with the discharge and extension of term clauses, and
considered in light of the aims of the title. If the grand jury is
considered the best judge of when its work has been completed, 61
it should also be able to determine when it is overburdened with
work and unable to discharge its obligations effectively. The fear
of a "runaway" grand jury would be groundless if the initial
discretion to impanel an additional grand jury were left to the
district court, with a supplementary appeal provision. Sig-
nificantly, the addition of an appeal provision could prevent the
frustration of the grand jury investigation by an arbitrary action of
a district court.
62
55 See Senate Hearings 333 (statement of Henry S. Ruth).
"See S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), as originally proposed, reprinted in Senate
Hearings 5- 9.
57 See Letter of Judge Irving R. Kaufman, supra note 48.
58 See House Hearings 553, 560 (statement of the Section of Criminal Law of the
American Bar Association). A "runaway" grand jury is a descriptive term which applies to
a grand jury that has expanded its investigation beyond the recommendations of the
prosecutor.
59 18 U.S.C.A. § 3331(b) (Supp. 1971).60 Id.
61 SENATE REPORT 141.
62 The original provision in S. 30 dealing with this problem compelled the district court
to summon an additional grand jury upon a "showing of need" by the special grand jury. It
also contained an appeal provision. See § 3324(d) of S. 30, 91 st Cong., I st Sess. (1969), as
initially introduced, reprinted in Senate Hearings 7-8.
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C. Presentation of Evidence to the Special Grand Jury
It was previously noted that title I requires a prosecutor, upon
the demand of any person providing information concerning al-
leged offenses against the United States, to inform the grand jury
of such alleged offense and the identity of such person.63 The law
existing at the time of the Act's passage granted the prosecutor
certain discretion as to what he chose to present to the grand
jury.6 4 By requiring the prosecutor to inform the grand jury of all
offenses alleged by any outside person, upon that persons'
request, section 3332(a) enables that outside person in effect, to
usurp the discretion of the prosecutor in deciding what cases or
evidence to present to the grand jury. It is true that the prosecutor
can also give his recommendation as to how the grand jury should
act on this information, but he still is required to "inform" the
grand jury.
65
Furthermore, the scope of the special grand jury's power of
investigation is not restricted to organized crime, but is the same
as that of a regular grand jury; it may inquire into all crimes
against the United States. 66 Thus, from the language of the statute
it appears that a prosecutor, who may be in the midst of con-
ducting a highly sophisticated investigation into organized crime
with a special grand jury, can be compelled to present to the
special grand jury information concerning a non-related federal
criminal offense. Since individuals can demand that information
be submitted to a grand jury only if it is a "special" grand jury, the
likelihood of submission of non-related cases to such a grand jury
is increased. This would be the case despite the fact that the
prosecutor feels it more desirable for a regular grand jury to act
on this information, or even though he has already presented this
information to a regular grand jury. An even more disturbing
result can occur when the prosecutor is presented with groundless
complaints. Previously, he has had complete discretion to ignore
the complaint and allow the work of a regular grand jury to
continue uninterrupted. Ironically, a body that has been created to
engage in the most sophisticated type of criminal investigations
can be compelled to be subjected to the latest gossip in the
district.67
-6-18 U.S.C.A. § 3332(b) (Supp. 1971).
6 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
6 18 U.S.C.A. § 3332(a) (Supp. 1971).
6 See note 21 supra and accompanying text. Although the grand jury's attention may be
directed to a particular field of investigation it may not be precluded from considering
other matters. See United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 309 n.l 10 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
67 116 CONG. REC. H9661-62 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1970) (statement by Representative
Abner J. Mikva).
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The above result is clearly contrary to what Congress had in
mind when it passed title I. As S. 30 was first proposed, it
guaranteed to every person the opportunity to communicate evi-
dence to the grand jury foreman. 68 When the bill emerged from
the Senate, it still allowed individuals to transmit knowledge of
alleged offenses to the special grand jury, but eliminated the
language guaranteeing this opportunity.
69
The bill then passed to the House Committee, where it suffered
some criticism by the Section of Criminal Law of the American
Bar Association. The subsection allowing citizen complaints to be
made directly to the grand jury was in direct conflict with Stan-
dard 3.4(c) of the Tentative Draft of the ABA Standards on the
Prosecution and Defense Function.70 Accordingly, the ABA rec-
ommended adoption of the latter standard 71 providing for citizen
complaints to be presented to the prosecutor so that he may
evaluate the evidence to determine whether the complaint merits
action. 72 The prosecutor would then communicate to the grand
jury only his action or recommendation. 73 As stated in the Report
of the Section of Criminal Law of the ABA, the specific aim of
this standard is "[to prevent] the filing of many groundless crimi-
nal charges that can clog the criminal justice system."
74
The manner in which Congress chose to implement the recom-
mendation, however, gave it a completely contrary effect. By
requiring the prosecutor to present the substance of each com-
plaint, instead of just a summary of his actions, Congress appears
to have completely eliminated the prosecutor's discretion.
75
If the subsection was structured in this manner to act as a
check on the prosecutor, it still does not appear to be effective. As
a practical matter, the prosecutor's recommendations will usually
be accepted on their face by the grand jury, and the complaints
6 8
See proposed § 3324(b), (c), S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in Senate
Hearings 7.
69 See proposed § 3332(b), reprinted in SENATE REPORT 3. This deletion was made to
prevent the drawing of the negative inference that individuals could not transmit in-
formation to regular grand juries. See SENATE REPORT 14 1- 42.
70 House Hearings 554.
71 Id. 56 1.
72 See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Commentary on Stan-
dard 3.4(c), at 85 (Tent. Draft 1970).
73 Id.
74 House Hearings 56 1.
75 If only the prosecutor's actions on each complaint were required to be presented, it
seems that he could proceed in summary fashion without expending much time of the
special grand jury. On the other hand, by requiring the prosecutor to present, in addition,
information concerning each alleged offense and the name of each complainant, it seems
that the provision almost regressed to its initial stage, where groundless citizen complaints
can inundate the grand jury.
[VOL. 4:3
Special Grand Jury
will be forgotten. 76 In addition, there is no way to ascertain
whether the prosecutor is indeed performing this duty. Due to the
secrecy of the proceeding, a citizen complainant could not exam-
ine the minutes of the grand jury to see if his complaint was
presented. 77 Although in rare instances the court might find
sufficient grounds for an in camera examination, no record is in
fact required to be kept on the grand jury proceedings. 78 Con-
sequently, this provision does not seem to be an effective check
on the, prosecutor 79 and imposes unnecessary burdens on the
special grand jury.
IV. REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL GRAND JURY
A. Reporting Procedures
Title I authorizes a special grand jury to issue two types of
reports which may be submitted to the court upon the completion
of the special grand jury's original term or upon the completion of
each extension.80 One type of report can be submitted "regarding
organized crime conditions in the district."81 This provision in-
corporates into the Act a recommendation of the President's
76 See Special Investigating Grand jury, supra note 28, at 968:
[The prosecutor's] role in directing the investigation is pervasive; he in-
terviews potential witnesses and determines who will testify, conducts the
interrogation before the grand jury, and advises on the law and the sufficiency
of evidence. Because of his position as a lawyer and [public official], he is
normally highly effective and persuasive. The National Commission on Law
Observance and Enforcement has concluded that 'the grand jury is seldom
better than a rubber stamp of the prosecuting attorney .... '
77 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). In United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677
(1958), the Supreme Court, discussing the policy of grand jury secrecy, stated:
[A] long-established policy ... maintains the secrecy of the grand jury pro-
ceedings in the federal courts .... The reasons are varied. One is to encour-
age all witnesses to step forward and testify freely without fear of retali-
ation .... This indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings, [citation
omitted] must not be broken except where there is a compelling necessi-
ty .... Id. at 681-82.
78 E.g., Nipp v. United States, 422 F.2d 509, 512 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 913 (1970); United States v. Ayers, 426 F.2d 524, 529 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 842 (1970); United States v. Watson, 421 F.2d 1357, 1358 (9th Cir. 1970); Loux v.
United States, 389 F.2d 911 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 867 (1968). See I C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Criminal § 103 (1969). This Act does not
appear to alter this requirement. See note 100 infra.
79 Even if a grand jury decided to ignore the prosecutor's recommendations and proceed
upon a complaint, the provision would still not act as an effective check upon the
prosecutor. Courts have held that a true bill voted by a grand jury will not become a valid
indictment if the prosecutor refuses to affix his signiture. See In re Grand Jury Impaneled
January, 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1970); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). In both cases, the United States Attorney refused
to sign an otherwise valid indictment. The courts refused to order the indictment to be
signed. See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1971, at 15, col. 3 (city ed.) (U.S. Attorney for
Utah refused to sign otherwise valid indictment against county sheriff).
80 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(a) (Supp. 1971). See SENATE REPORT 142.
81 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(a)(2) (Supp. 197 I).
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Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice.8 2 Reports of this type are restricted to those of a general
nature,83 but may be comprehensive and include social, economic
and other types of data.8 4 This type of report may not be critical
of an "identified" person.8 5
The second type of report may be submitted "concerning non-
criminal misconduct, malfeasance, or misfeasance in office in-
volving organized criminal activity by an appointed public officer
or employee as the basis for a recommendation of removal or
disciplinary action." 8 6  The restriction that requires the
wrongdoing to be related to organized criminal activity was in-
serted to confine the scope of this report provision to that neces-
sary to fulfill the purpose of the Act-to control organized
crime. 87 To further serve this purpose, the clause, "misconduct,
malfeasance or misfeasance in office" was substituted for the
original clause "misconduct, nonfeasance, or neglect in office." 88
This change should restrict the reportable acts to those which
contain some degree of "evil intent."8 9
Another amendment, 90 weakening the report provision to the
extent that it may substantially frustrate its purpose, restricts
those subject to reports to appointed "public officer[s] or employ-
ee[s]" as opposed to merely "public officer[s] or employee[s]." 91
When a report of this type is submitted, each person named
therein is given the opportunity to testify before the grand jury,
92
and may compel the attendance of a reasonable number of wit-
nesses to testify in his favor.9 3 In addition, he may file an answer,
8 2
See H.R. REP. No. 91- 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1970). [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT].
83 See SENATE REPORT 49.
84Id. 143.
85 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(b)(2) (Supp. 1971). As used here, the word "identified" is not
synonymous with "named," but would include any means of identification sufficient "to
establish clearly to what individual a report refers." 116 CONG. REC. S8648 (daily ed. June
9, 1970) (statement by Senator McClellan). This could include identification by name, job
classification, or any other clear reference. Id. See also HOUSE REPORT 77.
86 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(a)(1) (Supp. 1971). It is to be noted that the misconduct, malfea-
sance, or misfeasance must not itself be criminal but must relate to organized criminal
activity. Id. See also HousE REPORT 40.
87
See Senate Hearings 331 (recommendation of the National Association of Counties).
88
See S. 30, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., proposed § 3330(a)(1), as introduced in the Senate,
January 15, 1969, reprinted in Senate Hearings 9. See also Senate Hearings 331.
89 Senate Hearings 33 I. This change would remove from the ambit of this provision the
local public official who negligently happened to miss ten zoning meetings. Id.
9 0
Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(a)(1) (Supp. 1971) as enacted, with its structure as it
entered the House. (See House Hearings 7).
91 Id. (emphasis added).
92 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(b)(2) (Supp. 1971).
93 Id. See HOUSE REPORT 78 for construction inferring the use of the subpoena power to
compel attendance of witnesses.
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which becomes an appendix to the report subject to the court's
power to strike any part inserted "scandalously, prejudiciously, or
unnecessarily. ' 94 The answer must be submitted within twenty
days of service of the report on such officer or employee, except
when an extension is obtained upon a showing of good cause.
95
Both types of reports are to be based on facts revealed in the
course of an investigation into criminal offenses.96 Investigations
may not be conducted into noncriminal conduct for the purpose of
writing a report. 97 Thus, a report concerning noncriminal conduct
of appointed officials can only be submitted if supported by in-
formation disclosed incident to a criminal investigation by a spe-
cial grand jury.98 It is not proper for a report to be submitted
concerning criminal misconduct of officials for which there is
insufficient evidence to support an indictment. 99
Before reports submitted to the court may be published as a
public record, the district court must be satisfied, after an exam-
ination of the grand jury minutes, 100 that the report is based on a
preponderance of the evidence, is supported by facts revealed in
an authorized criminal investigation, and conforms to the other
requirements set forth above. 101 The court's determination is sub-
ject to appellate review. 10 2 If the court is not satisfied that the
94 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(c)(2) (Supp. 1971).
95 ld.
96 Id. § 3333(b)(1).
97 Id. See HOUSE REPORT 77.
98 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(b)(I) (Supp. 1971). See HOUSE REPORT 77.
99 McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or its Critics: Which Threatens Civil
Liberties? 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 76-77 (1970). It is important to note this dis-
tinction, as this could be the exact situation in which a grand jury might be most tempted
to issue a report.
100 This safeguard is of dubious value when no record of the grand jury proceedings are
kept. A record of this nature has not been required in the federal system, see note 78
supra, and Congress did not intend to alter this practice when enacting this Act. SENATE
REPORT 144. See also House Hearings 125 (remarks of Representative Emanuel Celler).
The SENATE REPORT, in discussing the regulation of the disclosure of grand jury testi-
mony, specifically stated:
There is no intention, however, to require that grand jury testimony be
recorded. This follows the prevailing present practice of making recordation
optional [citations omitted]. The statute is intended to come into operation
only if such recordation is undertaken. Id. 144.
However, one legislator believes that testimony taken before a special grand jury is
required to be recorded because the title requires a court to examine a submitted report
"and the minutes of the special grand jury" (18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(b) (Supp. 1971) ) before it
can accept the report. See 116 CONG. REC. S8648 (daily ed. June 9, 1970) (remarks of
Senator McClellan); McClellan, supra note 99, at 74. On the other hand, in view of the
preceding language from the SENATE REPORT, it is clear that Congress did not have this
intent. It would not insert specific language expressing an intent to follow the existing
recording practice applicable to all grand juries, if it intended to alter, sub silentio, this
practice with respect to the special grand jury.
101 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(b) (Supp. 1971).
102 Id. § 3333(c)(1). See HOUSE REPORT 78. Although this section contains a reference
to an appeal, the section has been criticized for failing to set forth a specific procedure for
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report dealing with official misconduct has satisfied the require-
ments concerning accuracy or opportunity to testify, it may seal
the report or direct the taking of additional testimony.10 3 The
maximum term of the special grand jury may be exceeded to
enable these requirements to be satisfied.
10 4
In addition, reports of the type criticizing public officials may
not be made public until at least thirty-one days after service of
the report on each person named therein, and after an answer has
been filed or the time for such filing has expired.' 0 5 There may be
no publication during the pendency of any appeal taken. 10 6 Also,
reports of this nature may not be made public until thirty days
after copies have been delivered to each body or official having
authority over the named public official.' 0 7 Copies are given to
these authorities so the report can serve "as a basis for a recom-
mendation of removal or disciplinary action."' 1 8 The court can
issue orders to prevent unauthorized publications, and can punish
such publication through the use of contempt citations.' 09 More-
over, if a court finds that the filing of such a report will prejudice a
fair consideration of a pending criminal matter, it may seal the
report during the pendency of such matters. 1 0
B. Shortcomings of the Report Provisions
The grant of power to the special grand jury that allows the
issuing of reports has evoked much controversy. A fundamental
criticism of grand jury reports, in general, has been stated by now
Chief Judge Stanley H. Fuld in an opinion of the New York
Court of Appeals:"'
In the public mind, accusation by a report is in-
distinguishable from accusation by indictment and subjects
the taking of an appeal. See House Hearings 302. In response, Senator McClellan stated
that a fair reading of the title would lead to the conclusion that the report sections involve
civil proceedings and would apply the appropriate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
concerning appeals. 116 CONG. REC. S8648 (daily ed. June 9, 1970). See also HOUSE
REPORT 78.
103 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(e) (Supp. 1971). See HOUSE REPORT 41.
104 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(e) (Supp. 1971). See HOUSE REPORT 41.
105 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(c)(1) (Supp. 1971). See HOUSE REPORT 40-41.
106 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(c)(1) (Supp. 1971). See HOUSE REPORT 40-41.
10718 U.S.C.A. § 3333(c)(1) (Supp. 1971). See HOUSE REPORT 40-41. These copies
may not be served on the appropriate authorities before the other "delay" provisions have
expired. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(c)(3) (Supp. 1971).
1
0
3See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(a)(1) (Supp. 1971).
1'Id. § 3333(c)(1). See HOUSE REPORT 41.
110 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(d) (Supp. 1971).
111 Wood v. Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d 144, 154, 173 N.E.2d 21, 26, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33, 39-40
(1961) (appeal by foreman of grand jury to set aside lower court's order sealing the grand




those against whom it is directed to the same public con-
demnation and opprobrium as if they had been in-
dicted .... A grand jury report-which as a judicial docu-
ment obviously differs radically from newspaper charges of
misconduct-carries the same sense of authoritative con-
demnation as an indictment does, without, however, accord-
ing the accused the benefit of the protections accorded to one
who is indicted."
l2
Subsequent to the above decision, New York enacted a statute
providing safeguards designed to ameliorate these potential in-
justices. 113 The presently enacted federal reporting provisions
were modeled after the New York statute.1 4 However, there
exist significant differences between the two.
1. Reports based on Non-Probative Evidence?-A Need for
Standards-The standard of evidence required to sustain the re-
ports differs under the two statutes. The New York statute re-
quires a court to accept a report only if the report "is supported
by the preponderance of the credible and legally admissible evi-
dence" (emphasis added)." 5 On the other hand, title I requires
only that the report be supported by "the preponderance of the
evidence." 1' 6 By the deletion of the words "credible and legally
admissible," Congress has implicitly given its approval to the
release of special grand jury reports based on evidence, such as
hearsay, that would be inadmissible in a formal judicial proceed-
ing' 17 and the probative value of which may be outweighed by its
prejudicial effect."
8
Supporters of the provision have commented that the difference
in the two standards "reflects a difference in the evidentiary rules
of the two jurisdictions. ""19 New York restricts the evidence the
grand jury may receive in an investigation to "none but legal
evidence.' 20 For the grand jury to indict, the evidence should be




N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §253a (McKinney Supp. 1970). See 116 CONG. REC.
H9649 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1970) (statement by Representative Poff), See also House
Hearings 122.
114 SENATE REPORT 142. See also House Hearings 122.
115 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 253-a(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
116 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(b)(1) (Supp. 1971); See report submitted by the COMMITTEE ON
FEDERAL LEGISLATION, ASSOCIATION OF 'THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE
PROPOSED ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969 (S. 30) (1970), reprinted in House
Hearings 291, at 301 [hereinafter cited as A BCN Y].
117 Letter from Dept. of Justice to Emanuel Celler, July 23, 1970, reprinted in HousE
REPORT 75, at 77-78.
118 Cf. House Hearings 626.
119 See note 117 supra.
12
0
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 249 (McKinney 1958). See Id. § 248.
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viction at trial.121 However, the federal grand jury may indict on
any credible evidence that satisfies the standard of probable cause
that the accused committed the offense, 22 even if such evidence
is not admissible at trial. Indictments may be supported entirely
by hearsay.'
23
Although it is true, then, that grand jury indictments have
different bases in the two jurisdictions, the underlying rationale
for allowing the federal grand jury to act on incompetent evidence
in handing down an indictment does not apply in the reporting
situation. When determining whether there is sufficient evidence
to indict, the grand jury is functioning as a safeguard against
oppressive actions of a prosecutor or court. 124 It is not restricted
by the rules of evidence since the accusation, if an indictment is
returned, will be ultimately tested by a petit jury, operating under
strictly applied rules, evaluating only the legally admissible evi-
dence.' 2 5 The determination by the petit jury is subject to appel-
late review. Thus, the grand jury provides an initial screening
function, while a final determination, subject to review, is made on
the basis of legal evidence. When the grand jury issues a report,
however, it is not performing a screening function. It is not
fulfilling its constitutional function of protecting an accused from
unjust charges. It is itself the accusor. There will be no ultimate
determination of the truth of the allegations at trial, based strictly
on legal evidence, and the accused will not have the opportunity
to confront and cross-examine hostile witnesses. Thus, the
different nature of the function that the grand jury serves when it
issues reports requires that it act only on legally competent evi-
121 Id. § 25 I. That is, a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
122 For statements of the probable cause standard see, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342
F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); Silverthorne v. United States,
400 F.2d 627, 634 (9th Cir. 1968); In re Grand Jury Impaneled January, 1969, 315 F.
Supp. 662, 671 (D. Md. 1970). See HOUSE REPORT 78.
123 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956). (Court upheld indictment for tax
evasion based solely on hearsay testimony of government agents who had no personal
knowledge of the transactions to which they testified, but cf. United States v. Umans, 368
F.2d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 389 U.S. 80
(1967). There the court accepted the vitality of Costello, but admonished prosecutors that
"[h]earsay evidence should only be used when direct testimony is unavailable or when it is
demonstrably inconvenient to summon witnesses able to testify to facts from personal
knowledge."
124 See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935
(1965); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962); In re Grand Jury Impaneled January,
1969, 315 F. Supp. 662, 671 (D. Md. 1970). The court in Cox stated:
The constitutional requirement of an indictment.., as a predicate to a
prosecution for.capital or infamous crimes has for its primary purpose the
protection of the individual from jeopardy except on a finding of probable
cause by a group of his follow citizens, and is designed to afford a safeguard
against oppressive actions of the prosecutor or a court. 342 F.2d at 170.
125 Cf. Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 634 (9th Cir. 1968).
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dence. An authoritative supporter of grand jury reports considers
the preceding requirement a fundamental safeguard to prevent
abusive use of the reports.
1 2 6
Although the commentator suggests even a higher burden of
proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) than a court would be applying
upon review under title 1,127 the standard that does govern (pre-
ponderance of the evidence) is diluted further as a safeguard when
it is not based on legal evidence. The judge, who is given no
standard under title I to apply in his objective evaluation, would
be weighing evidence that may contain hearsay or even double
hearsay.
1 28
Senator McClellan, an original sponsor of the Act, has recently
made an attempt to rebut this criticism.1 29 He argues that the
courts do have "guidelines" for weighing the reliability of hearsay
and are constantly doing so.' 3 0 In this regard, a case is cited
where a court, in reviewing on appeal a criminal conviction,
13 1
allowed hearsay to be admitted under an exception to the hearsay
rule, but then rejected its probative value. l3 2 Yet, it is erroneous
to analogize the evaluation of hearsay evidence admitted on an
exception to the hearsay rule at trial with a grand jury report
based on hearsay evidence. For example, critics of the Act have
not contended that a court lacks ample guidelines to evaluate
evidence at a criminal trial. A judge weighs the probative value of
the evidence to determine whether there is sufficient evidence for
a conviction, 13 3 and in certain cases can supercede a jury's deter-
mination in directing an acquittal for a defendant.' 3 4 However, the
strict rules of evidence that apply to criminal trials do not apply to
grand jury proceedings 13 5 or to a district court's review of a
report. Prior to enactment of title I, a federal district court had not
even been permitted to weigh the sufficiency of evidence accumu-
lated by a grand jury as a basis for an indictment. 136 Now an




128 ABCNY, supra note 116, at 302.
129 McClellan, supra, note 99, at 74-75.
13 0 
Id.
131 United States v. Shiver, 414 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1969).
132 McClellan, supra note 99, at 74-75.
'33 His decision is determinative when trial is held without a jury. FED. R. CRIM. P.
23(c).
134
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. See, e.g., Gilliland v. United States, 385 F.2d 912, 915
(5th Cir. 1967).
135 See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
136 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956); United States v. Ramsey, 315
F.2d 199 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963); United States v. DiFronzo, 345
F.2d 383, 386 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1965); United States ex rel. Almeida
v. Rundle, 383 F.2d 421, 425 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 863 (1968).
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entirely new obligation is imposed on the courts to review the
evidence upon which a grand jury report is founded, but they are
not given any guidelines upon which to weigh a record that could
be composed entirely of hearsay. It is unclear whether they are
supposed to find the preponderance of only probative and reliable
evidence, or whether the preponderance of hearsay evidence will
suffice. Senator McClellan himself has pointed out the danger of
equating a trial in which a determination of criminal guilt is made,
with a grand jury report which does not adjudicate but only makes
an accusation of non-criminal misconduct.1
3 7
Senator McClellan further argues that the fact that courts have
had much experience reviewing decisions of administrative
agencies, which are permitted to base their decisions in part on
hearsay, indicates that courts can make the determination re-
quired by the Act.13 8 Moreover, it is asserted that the use of
hearsay evidence has not prevented the courts from reviewing the
determinations of these agencies under the "substantial evidence"
rule, citing section 556(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act.
13 9
However, this example supports, rather than undermines, the
criticism of title I. The cited section of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act specifically requires determinations of the administrative
agency to be supported by "reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence." Thus Congress has set down guidelines (i.e., that the
evidence must be reliable and probative) for the administrative
agencies to follow, and for the courts to employ on review. Yet,
nowhere in title I is there any guideline as to the type of evidence
necessary to sustain the preponderance standard.
The distinction between the nature of the reporting and in-
dicting functions suggests that the district court should approve a
grand jury report only if it is supported by the preponderance of
credible and legally admissible evidence. For example, an in-
vestigative grand jury, operating unhampered by the rules of evi-
dence, 140 might find itself considering illegally seized evidence.
Although on occasion the exclusionary rule has been held not to
apply to grand jury proceedings, 141 the rationale supporting these
decisions has been that "the defendant [has] ample opportunity at
137 116 CONG. REC. S8647 (daily ed. June 9, 1970) (statement of Senator McClellan).
138 McClellan, supra note 99, at 75.
139 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. 111, 1968). McClellan, supra note 99, at 75.
140 Note 123 supra. See also United States v. Fox, 425 F.2d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 1970)
(grand jury not governed by strict evidentiary rules that apply to trial proceedings-court
has discretion to quash indictment because of incompetent evidence admitted).
141 West v. United States, 359 F.2d 50, 56 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 867 (1966);
Laughlin v. United States, 385 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 290 U.S.
1003 (1968); Truchinski v. United States, 393 F.2d 627, 634 (8th Cir. 1968).
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trial to prevent any ultimate prejudice stemming from the govern-
ment's illegal actions. 1' 42 This rationale is clearly inapplicable to
the report situation in which such opportunity to prevent prej-
udice at trial will not be granted the defendant. He should be
given the opportunity when the district court reviews the report to
object to illegally seized evidence used to support such a report,
and to the extent he is successful, have such portions of the report
expunged.
Requiring reports to be based upon legally competent evidence
would not impede a grand jury investigation; the evidence gather-
ing process would remain unaltered. The grand jury would only be
prevented from basing its report on incompetent evidence to the
ultimate prejudice of the defendant.
Although certain incompetent evidence, such as agents' sum-
maries of numerous business transactions, 143 may be far less
objectionable than illegally seized evidence, the same policy that
precludes the admission of such incompetent evidence at trial
should prevent its use to support a grand jury report. Such evi-
dence is admissible before a grand jury since it may be bur-
densome to produce the appropriate witnesses and material at
both the trial and grand jury proceedings.144 However, when a
trial will not be forthcoming, and instead a report is issued, no
additional burden is imposed by requiring the report to be sup-
ported by competent evidence prior to publication.
The only reason suggested for the change from requiring a
report to be accepted if "supported by the preponderance of the
credible and legally admissible evidence," as required in the New
York Statute, to "preponderance of the evidence" is that "feder-
al grand juries can consider hearsay evidence while New York
State grand juries cannot."'' However, this rationale does not
suggest any reason why a federal grand jury cannot consider
hearsay evidence in its investigations, but be required to base its
reports on "credible and legally admissible evidence." 1 46 Sim-
ilarly, no reason has been advanced to show why a district court
should not use this standard on review to determine whether the
requisite burden of the preponderance of this type of evidence is
met. Only if these steps are taken will this provision for review be
a meaningful safeguard.
2. Reports on Appointed Public Officials: A Question of a
142 Laughlin v. United States, 385 F.2d at 29 1.
143See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361 (1956).
144 Id. at 363.
145 McClellan, supra note 99, at 74. See also HOUSE REPORT 77-78.
146 See Kuh, supra note 126, at 1126- 27.
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Double Standard-Another significant difference between the
New York statute allowing grand jury reports and the correspond-
ing federal provisions is that the New York statute allows the
grand jury to report on the misconduct of all public officers or
employees,1 47 whereas the federal provision limits the power to
report on the misconduct of only an "appointed public officer or
employee. ' 148 The original draft of S. 30 authorized special grand
juries to report on all public officers or employees, regardless of
whether elected or appointed.1 49 The restricting amendment oc-
curred after the bill had emerged from the House Judiciary Com-
mittee in its final form.1 50 Although the provisions of the reports
section, along with suggested changes, were extensively debated
in the House of Representatives it does not appear that an amend-
ment of this nature was ever discussed.' 51 After the provision was
amended, it was severely criticized and the motives of the com-
mittee were impugned. Both the strongest supporters 152 and
strongest critics 153 of grand jury reports objected to this change.
Two reasons were offered in support of its enactment. First, it
was suggested that the limitation will prevent the special grand
jury from playing politics and attempting to abuse its power by
influencing the outcome of an election.' 54 Secondly, proponents of
the measure contended that the limitation will avoid confusion as
to what body to submit a report "as the basis for a recommenda-
tion of removal or disciplinary action." In the case of appointed
officials, the report would be submitted to the appointing agency,
147 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 253a(l)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
148 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(a)(1) (Supp. 1971).
14 9See S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3330(a) (1969) as proposed, reprinted in Senate
Hearings 9.
150 Compare proposed 18 U.S.C. § 3333(a)(I) as reprinted in House Hearings 7, with
the section reprinted in HOUSE REPORT 3.
151 See generally, House Hearings.
15 2 See 116 CONG. REC. S17773 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1970) (statement by Senator
McClellan):
Possibly the most weakening amendment passed by the House is the one that
excludes elected officials from those persons who might be made the subjects
of grand jury reports .... I, for one, do not see how we can make applicable
to others provision (sic) of a bill which we are unwilling to have apply to
ourselves.
153 See dissenting views of Representatives John Conyers, Jr., Abner Mikva, and Wil-
liam F. Ryan, HouSE REPORT 181, at 182.
See also 116 CONG. REC. H9669 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1970) (letter from American Civil
Liberties Union):
The committee's unwillingness to permit Congressmen to be subjected to this
kind of public smearing, but to allow it to be done to appointed officials,
raises a serious question about a double standard. Surely what should be
sauce for the goose should be sauce for the gander.




but if the report covered elected officials, it would be unclear to
whom such report should be submitted. 155
The first justification ignores the safeguards in the section. A
report cannot be published until a court, albeit inadequately, re-
views the evidence upon which it is based. 156 The section con-
tains other prerequisites for publication which will result in an
additional time interval between the time a report may be sub-
mitted to a court and the time it may eventually be released to the
press.157 A court should be able to determine whether a grand
jury has abused its powers in an attempt to wrongfully influence
the outcome of an election. In that event, the grand jury can order
the report sealed and prevent its becoming a public record. 158 The
contempt power will serve as a deterrent against unauthorized
publication.
159
If a court determines the report is supported by the evidence, it
is arguable that the official misconduct should be revealed to the
electorate, especially immediately prior to an election. 160 If the
fear is that the safeguards provided are not adequate to protect
effectively an elected public official from unjustified charges of
misconduct, 161 the remedy should not be the removal of elected
officials from the reach of reports while appointed officials are left
exposed to the danger. Rather, the solution should lie in strength-
ening the precautions or deleting the reports section in its entirety.
The second reason offered to support the amendment is equally
questionable. It is not necessary to restrict the applicability of this
provision solely for the purpose of clarifying the body to which a
report should be submitted "as the basis for a recommendation of
removal or disciplinary action."1 62 It is just as simple to determine
which body has jurisdiction over elected officials as it is to
155 Id. at H9655.





16 0 Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
161 The American Bar Association-Section of Criminal Law expressed fear that a politi-
cally motivated prosecutor in charge of a grand jury investigation could exploit the report
power of the grand jury when there is insufficient evidence for an indictment, denying the
charged official the right to defend himself at trial. See House Hearings 561. It must be
remembered that federal prosecutors-the United States Attorneys-are not elected but
appointed and are more insulated from local politics. In addition, if there were probable
cause for an indictment, a politically motivated prosecutor would be even more able to
exploit the facts for political purposes. He could have an indictment issued just prior to an
election, and the accused would be denied the opportunity to defend himself at trial before
the election because of the inevitable delay that occurs between indictment and trial. With
the already-existing opportunities for political exploitation, some reliance must be given to
the high quality of federal appointments.
162 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333(a)(1) (Supp. 1971).
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determine which body has jurisdiction over an appointed official.
In addition, the argument seems to suggest that only appointed
officials are subject to removal or disciplinary action and that, if
an official is elected, he is ipso facto not subject to such sanc-
tions. 163 This is not necessarily the case. An official's categoriza-
tion as "elected" does not automatically exempt him from the
jurisdiction of a disciplinary body. For example, the Mayor of
New York City, though elected,16 4 is subject to removal by the
Governor. 165 Other elected officials are also subject to this sanc-
tion.166 Governors may be impeached by legislatures, 1 67 and fed-
eral legislators may be disciplined by their respective houses of
Congress.'
68
Moreover, it is in the public interest to inform the electorate
about the misconduct of their elected officials in the same way
that they are informed of misconduct concerning appointed
officials. In fact, it could be argued that they have a greater
interest in being informed of elected officials' misconduct, as these
individuals have been directly entrusted with the public con-
fidence. In essence, the purpose of the reports section is to allow
the public to determine whether its officials are acting in the
public interest. 69 The exposing of misconduct inspires the "pub-
lic confidence in the capacity of the body politic to purge itself of
untoward conditions.' 70 The public can most effectively act in
this manner through the exercise of their voting franchise. The
restricting amendment has withdrawn from this provision the au-
thority to inform the public of the misconduct of those officials
that are most representative of the community-its elected
officials-and has thus substantially defeated the purpose of the
section. 171 If this were the effect that Congress intended, it should
16 See 116 CONG. REC. H9655 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1970) (remarks of Representative
McCulloch).
164 N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 4 (1963).
165 Id. § 9.
166 See, e.g., N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 8 l(d) (1963) which provides for the removal of the
Borough Presidents of New York City by the Governor; MICH. CONST. art. 5, § 10 which
empowers the Governor to remove or suspend for misconduct "any elective or appointive
state officer, except legislative or judicial ...." (emphasis added).
167 See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 11, § 7;N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 24.
168 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
1
69 See 116 CONG. REC. H9649 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1970). (remarks of Representative
Poff). See also In re Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 66, 89 A.2d 416 (1952)
(Vanderbilt, C.J.).
170 In re Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 66, 89 A.2d 416 (1952).
171 It should be noted that of the states relied on to support the power to issue grand jury
reports (i.e., New York, California, Illinois, New Jersey, Florida, and Tennessee; SENATE
REPORT 49), those that allow officials to be named make no differentiation between
appointed and elected officials. See, e.g., State v. Clemmons, 150 So. 2d 231, 235 (Fla.
1963); In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Fla. 154, 1I So. 2d 316, 319 (1943); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 919(c) (West 1970).
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have deleted the power in its entirety; it should not have left
appointed officials exposed to dangers which they, as Congress-
men, are unwilling to face.
V. JENCKS ACT AMENDMENTS
A. Expanding the Scope of the Jencks Act
Title I also makes two significant changes in the Jencks Act.
172
Although these amendments are included in title I, they are not
directly related to, nor confined to the special grand jury. Prior to
these amendments the Jencks Act provided that statements made
to agents of the Government by prospective government wit-
nesses were not to be subject to discovery, inspection or sub-
poena until after the witness had testified on direct examination at
trial. 173 These statements could be obtained after the direct exam-
ination of such a government witness to the extent that they
related to the subject matter of the testimony.1 74 The amendments
alter the Act in the following respects: (1) the witnesses' state-
ments encompassed by the Jencks provisions must no longer be
made "to an agent of the Government," but include all such
statements in the possession of the Government; (2) grand jury
minutes are affirmatively brought within the scope of the defini-
tion of "statements." 175 Since this section concerns grand jury
minutes in general, it is not confined to the grand jury minutes of
the special grand jury. 176 In addition, the section specifically ap-
plies only to those statements before a grand jury that are record-
ed; it does not impose an obligation to record grand jury testi-
mony.177
B. Unanticipated Effects of the Amendments
The ramifications of the Jencks Act amendments are unclear
from the Hearings or Reports. It appears that these amendments
172 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500 (Supp. 1971). (O.C.C.A.
§ 102). The relevant sections of the Jencks Act and the amendments thereto are set forth
in notes 191- 194 infra.
173 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1964).
174 Id. § 3500(b).
175 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500 (Supp. 1971), amending 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964) (O.C.C.A.
§ 102). Although some courts have allowed grand jury minutes to be discovered at trial
under conditions similar to statements covered by the Jencks Act (see, e.g., United States
v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365 (2d. Cir. 1967); Harris v. United States, 433 F.2d 1127
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc); United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47, 53 (7th Cir. 1968),
vacated 394 U.S. 310 (1969)), the Jencks Act, before amendment, specifically did not
apply to grand jury minutes. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395,
398 (1959); 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1861, 1862.
1
76 See ABCNY, supra note 116, at 303.
177 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500(e) (Supp. 1971), O.C.C.A. § 102(d). SENATE REPORT 144. See
note 100 supra. See also House Hearings 554 (statement of Section of Criminal Law of
the ABA).
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were treated as poor cousins to the special grand jury provisions.
The controversy generated over the adoption of the latter over-
shadowed any extensive discussion of the effects of these amend-
ments.
1. Pretrial Discovery of Grand Jury Testimony-Section 102
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was proposed to
substitute a uniform statutory procedure for handling disclosure of
grand jury testimony in place of the diverse practices developing
among the circuit courts of appeals. 178 It was considered a liber-
alization of the Jencks Act as it allows a defendant to compel the
production of grand jury testimony at trial without first having to
demonstrate a particularized need.
179
It has been suggested, however, that the amendments in section
102 will have a restrictive effect on pretrial discovery.'8 0 It is
further charged that the alterations are both inconsistent with the
1966 amendments to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure implemented to expand the scope of pretrial dis-
covery,18' and contrary to the "growing realization that dis-
closure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily
promotes the proper administration of criminal justice.' 82 In
addition, these changes are criticized as being enacted without
any extended study or specific rationale.' 8 3 Although the drafters
might have been aware of this possible consequence, the desir-
ability of restricting discovery was not even presented to the
respective committees for consideration. It is questionable wheth-
er Congress intended this restrictive effect, and whether the resul-
tant amendment should be interpreted as positively restricting
discovery of grand jury testimony to the trial stage.
The Bar Association of the City of New York suggests that the
inclusion of grand jury minutes in the Jencks Act would restrict a
178 SENATE REPORT 144.
179 See House Hearings 625. The state of federal practice at the time of enactment of
this change is divergent on this point. Some courts had already allowed this liberalization,
see e.g., United States v. Ayers, 426 F.2d 524, 528-29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
842 (1970); Harris v. United States, 433 F.2d 1127, supra note 175 and other cases cited
therein; while others required a showing of particularized need. See e.g., National Dairy
Products Corp. v. United States, 384 F.2d 457, 461 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
957 (1968); United States v. Fuentes, 432 F.2d 405, 408 (5th Cir. 1970); Melton v.
United States, 398 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1968).
18°See ABCNY, supra note 116, at 305; see also House Hearings 493 (Statement of
Lawrence Speiser, then director, Washington office, American Civil Liberties Union).
181 Id. See NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES, on Rule 16, 18 U.S.C.A. Rule
16 (1969). See also PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, 48 F.R.D.
553, 587 (1970). The proposed draft even further liberalizes discovery in criminal cases.
182 Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966). See ABCNY, supra note 116, at
305.
183 See note 180 supra.
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court's ability to release these minutes prior to the witnesses'
direct examination at trial. 184 Prior to this amendment, courts
have ruled that statements made by prospective government wit-
nesses to government agents are only discoverable under the
provisions of the Jencks Act-that is, only after direct exam-
ination of the witness-and therefore, are not subject to pretrial
discovery. 185 Rule 16(b) explicitly excludes from discovery state-
ments of government witnesses that are covered by the Jencks
Act.188 Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that the inclusion of
grand jury minutes within the Jencks Act would subject them to
similar treatment and remove such minutes from the ambit of
pretrial discovery.
However, discovery of grand jury testimony is also controlled
by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
addition to the new Jencks Act amendment. The Rule provides
that matters before the grand jury can be disclosed by a court
"preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding"
(emphasis added). 187 This has been interpreted to allow disclosure
of grand jury minutes of witnesses before trial, 188 as well as after
direct examination of the witness at trial. 189 In view of Congress'
failure to alter the language in Rule 6(e) (or denote a conflict,
recommending to the Supreme Court that a reconciliation be
undertaken), and the purpose of the amendments, 90 the power of
courts to disclose grand jury testimony "preliminarily" may not
be impaired by the passage of this Act. A careful scrutiny of the
section (18 U.S.C. § 3500) before and after amendment, will
clarify this view.
The Jencks Act can conceptually be broken up into three
sections: subsection (a) contains the general prohibition on dis-
covery of statements until direct examination at trial;' 9 subsec-
184 See note 180 supra; House Hearings 304.
185 See, e.g., Sendejas v. United States, 428 F.2d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 879 (1970); Levy v. Parker, 316 F. Supp. 473 (M.D. Pa. 1970); United States v.
American Oil Co., 286 F. Supp. 742, 753 (D. N.J. 1968). See Palermo v. United States,
360 U.S. 343, 349 (1959).
186 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
187 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. at 869- 70.
188 See, e.g., Gibson v. United States, 403 F.2d 166, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Allen v.
United States, 390 F.2d 476, 482 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. Hughes, 413
F.2d 1244, 1255-57 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated sub nom. United States v. Gifford-Hill-
American, Inc., 397 U.S. 93 (1970); United States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993, 1021 (D.
N.J. 1968); United States v. Venn, 41 F.R.D. 540, 542 (S.D. Fla. 1966) (Rule 6(e)
"permits the judges to authorize the production of any Grand Jury proceedings prelimi-
narily to trial .... ).
189 Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. at 870. See also note 175 supra.
190 See notes 178, 179 supra and accompanying text.
191 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1964) before amendment provided:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or
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tions (b)-(d) concern the procedure for discovering the statements
after direct examination at trial; 192 and subsection (e) defines
"statement." However, the definition of "statement" applies ex-
plicitly only to subsections (b), (c), and (d), 193 the sections dealing
with the procedure for disclosure after direct examination at trial.
The amendment adds grand jury minutes to the definition of
"statement" in subsection (e),194 and thus does not apply to the
prohibition on pretrial discovery in subsection (a). This limited
change is consistent with the discussion in the Hearings that
interprets the amendment as liberalizing the Jencks Act to enable
defendants to obtain access to grand jury testimony that they
could not necessarily obtain before.1 95 There does not appear to
be any intent to restrict the pretrial discovery of these statements,
and the subsection of the Jencks Act dealing with the restriction
on pretrial discovery was not in fact amended (i.e., in relation to
grand jury testimony). Therefore, this subsection should be con-
strued as it has been prior to the passage of this amendment: as
not prohibiting the pretrial discovery of grand jury testimony.1 96
This construction would be consistent with the amendment's pur-
pose of unifying the procedure for discovery of grand jury testi-
mony after direct examination at trial, while avoiding an unin-
tended conflict with Rule 6(e).
2. The Effect on Pretrial Discovery of the Amendment "to an
agent of the Government"- With respect to the change striking
"to an agent of the Government," however, the congressional
report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Govern-
ment witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant)
to an agent of the Government shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or
inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of
the case.
The amendment relevant to this subsection strikes "to an agent of the Government."
192 The relevant part of these subsections was not amended, and provides: "(b) After a
witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on
motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any statement (as hereinafter
defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States.. .
193 The subsection before amendment provided:
(e) The term 'statement,' as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this
section in relation to any witness called by the United States, means-
(1) a written statement made by said witness ...
(2) a stenographic ... or other recording, which is a substantially verbatim
recital of an oral statement made by said. witness to an agent of the Govern-
ment.... (emphasis added).
Paragraph (2) is amended by striking "to an agent of the Government." Professor Wright
specifically notes that the definition in subsection (e) does not apply to subsection (a). 2 C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Criminal § 417, at 205 (1969).
194 Paragraph (3) is added to this subsection: "(3) a statement, however taken or
recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any, made by said witness to a grand jury." 18
U.S.C.A. § 3500(e)(3) (Supp. 1971).
195 House Hearings 624- 26.
19
9 See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 413 F.2d 1244, 1255-57 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated
sub nom. United States v. Gifford-Hill-American, Inc., 397 U.S. 93 (1970).
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purpose remains a mystery. This language was struck in both
subsection (a) and the definitional subsection (e). 197 Therefore, in
addition to liberalizing the Act by enabling all witnesses' state-
ments in the government's possession, regardless of whether these
statements were made to a government agent or to someone else,
to be examined after that witness has testified on direct exam-
ination, 198 the amendment, by striking the language in subsection
(a) dealing with pretrial discovery, also appears to bar these
additional statements from pretrial discovery. 199
These additional statements were previously discoverable un-
der Rule 16(b). A conflict between the amended Jencks Act and
Rule 16(b) may arise from the provision of 16(b) which speci-
fically excludes from pretrial discovery "statements made by gov-
ernment witnesses or prospective government witnesses (other
than the defendant) to agents of the government except as pro-
vided in [the Jencks Act]" (emphasis added).200
However, Rule 16(b) does not appear to bar pretrial discovery
of these statements of witnesses in the Government's possession
that were not made to the agents of the Government. 201 Further-
more, if Congress intended this restrictive effect on pretrial dis-
covery, it seems likely that it would have, in addition to amending
the Jencks Act, amended Rule 16(b) by striking the similar words
"to agents of the government," or at least recognized the in-
consistency, giving the appropriate recommendations for an
amendment of this nature. By not doing so, a conflict has been
created. The language of the amendment appears to restrict pre-
trial discovery in this situation. Moreover, since Rule 16 is a
general discovery provision while the new Jencks Act amend-
ment specifically deals with this problem, it would appear logical
that this restriction has been effectuated. However, in view of the
trend toward liberal discovery in criminal cases and Congress'
apparent unawareness of the restrictive effect on pretrial dis-
197 See notes 191 and 193 supra.
198 An example where this change would liberalize current practice is found in United
States v. Smith, 433 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1970). There the defendant desired statements of
a government witness after the witness testified on direct examination at trial. The motion
was denied because the statements were made to the Houston police, and not the F.B.I. as
alleged, and hence were not made to an agent of the Government. This amendment would
alleviate this technical distinction and allow the discovery of these statements.
1
99 
See note 191 supra.
2 0 0 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b); NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES, Rule 16,
subdivision (b)(3), 18 U.S.C.A. Rule 16 (1969).
201 
See United States v. Fancher, 195 F. Supp. 448, 450-51 (D. Conn. 1961) (although
this case was decided before the 1966 amendments to Rule 16, its holding is even stronger
today as the amendment liberalized discovery under the Rule.) See citation with approval,
United States v. Rosenberg, 299 F. Supp. 1241, 1243 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ); cf. United States
v. Smith, 433 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1970).
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covery, 20 2 it would seem proper to resolve the conflict between
section 102 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 and Rule
16(b) in favor of allowing discovery under Rule 16, rather than
restricting it under subsection (a) of the Jencks Act, as amended.
202 The restrictive effect of the amendment on pretrial discovery is not treated in either
the Senate or House Reports. The amendment striking "to an agent of the Government" is
not even recognized as any more significant than a "minor language change." See SENATE
REPORT 144. Section 102 was added in the Senate Committee and thus was not discussed
in the Senate Hearings. The only discussion in the House Hearings that even recognizes a
possible conflict between Rule 16(b) and the amendment appears at 624- 26. (Although the
ACLU and the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York point out the possible restrictive
effect of this amendment in their submitted statements, see note 180 supra, these effects
were not the subject of discussion during their appearance to testify.) There the issue was
raised but it was not really met as the discussion focused only on those features liberalizing
discovery at trial. No significant discussion on this point appears to have taken place on
the floor of Congress.
